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SummaJア
1he Supreme Court's decision in American Electric Power 
αConnecticut appeared to a伍rmwhat many legal schol-
ars have argued: that tort law is not a suitable or effective 
means to address dimate change. While it did dose a 
valuable door for plainti品 seekingto advance the“car-
bon tort，" it did not represent the end of tort law's role in 
providing relief for those whom dimate change impacts 
now and into the future. Tort law can address dimate 
impacts directly， by spurring compensation for harms 
incurred， and indirectly， by galvanizing both mitigation 
and adaptation measures to avoid the threat of liability. 
百lekey is finding the appropriate defendants-ones 
with whom the common law is quite familiar. Particu-
larly for the most vulnerable， the virtues of corrective 
justice and civil recourse-core goals of tort law-are 
especially meaningful and are key first steps in more 
transformative legal approaches to the dimate crisis. 
T h c u s S釦up一u旧聞山山一…r口m山E日ωsは20却 1叩山…l日川吋l凶de
Cω'an ELんectricPower v. Connecticut (AEl月う1appeared 
Eωo be anot出heαrnail in t出hec∞O伍nfoαr climate chanεC 
Eωor口tlitigation.2 1he prominent tort cases brought under 
public nuisance theory3 were derisively dubbed the“car-
bon torピヰ asthe defendants were m司orfossil fuel com-
panies and utilities-all significant emitters of carbon 
dioxide (C0
2
) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) at the 
root of increasingly destructive climate change. Reasoning 
that the federal common law was displaced by regulatory 
action commenced by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)，5 the AEP Court substantially limited pur-
suit of public nuisance claims in the federal courts，6 and 
at the same time mirrored a more widespread skepticism 
and fatigue with complex climate litigation expressed by 
many lower courts.7 1he skepticism regarding the viability 
of these claims was prevalent amongst many legal schol-
ars剖 well，8even if those scholars expressed deep interest 
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1. 131 S. Ct. 2ラ27，41ELR 21202 (2011) 
2. See Maxine Burket， Climateルstzce仰 dthe Elusive Clima町 Tort，121 
YALE L.]. ONLINE 1う(2011)， htp:/yalelawjournal.orgI2011/09/13/ 
burkett.html (last visited Oct. 26， 2012) (arguing that the AEP decision 
foreclosed significant posibilities for redres-particularly vital to the 
most vulnerable) 
3. See， e.g.， Native Vilage of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.， 2012 WL 
421ラ921;Comer v. Murphy Oil USA， Inc.， 607 F.3d 1049， 40 ELR 20147 
(2010); California v. GM Corp.， 2006 'v屯2726ラ47(N.D. Cal. 2006) (vol 
untaril y dismised ] une 2009) 
4. See， e.g.， The New Climate Litigation， 'V弘LST. ].， Dec. 28， 2009， htp:/ 
online.w斗com/article/SB 1 000 14240ラ2748703478704ラ746121ラ06212ラ
7422.html (last visited Oct. 26， 2012) 
ラ1heseactions resulted from a finding of目ldangermentto public health and 
welfare under the Clean Air Act (CAA)， 42 U.S.c. ~~7401-7671q， ELR 
STAT. CAA ~~1 0l -608 ， and were pursuant to the Courピ'searlier holding in 
Massachusetお v.EPA，ラ49U.S. 497， 497， 37 ELR 2007ラ(207)
6. At least for the time being， AEP stilleaves open two key questions: the fa日
of state common-law claims; and claims for damages， rather t 
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in aggressive emissions-reductions overall. In particular， 
the complex web of claims and defendants would make 
pretriallitigation， alone， unwieldy.9 Further， meeting each 
element of the tort of negligence-duty， breach， cause， 
and damages-would be a di伍culttask for any plaintif， 10 
with establishing the causal link between a defendant's 
emissions and the alleged harms as the most challenging.11 
While claimants seeking tort remedies from GHG emit-
ters have been stripped of a m司oravenue through which to 
pursue their claims， tort law stil can do a great amount to 
tackle the challenge of climate change. 
In this Article， I argue that exploring the liability of 
local governments and developers for harms suffered by 
coastal landowners reveals the potential for tort law to 
directly address climate impacts by providing a means of 
compensation for plaintif's losses. While this is not the 
fIrst Article to contemplate liab山tyfor alternative defen-
dants， in particular local governments，12 it is the五rstto 
situate this kind of liability in the goals of tort law and 
advocate for widespread use of adaptation liability as a 
means for individual redress and societywide protection 
from numerous climate-related harms. 1he threat ofliabil-
ity can also have the indirect e百ectof galvanizing measures 
to reduce emissions and spur more aggressive and compre-
hensive adaptation at the locallevel. To be sure， what the 
law of negligence vis-a-vis development planning， permit-
ting， and construction counsels with regard to emerging 
climate risks is uncertain in some instances. 1he increasing 
ab山tyto attribute， atleast in part， certain extreme weather 
events to climate change， however， suggests that五nding
negligence on the part of m司oractors that continue to put 
individuals in harm's way may be viable today and increas-
ingly so into the future. 
Further， litigation based on the failure to adapt may be 
a much easier road than the mitigation-oriented carbon 
torts五ledin the last several years.13 A plaintif， for example， 
would only need to prove the unreasonableness of defen-
danピsactions in light of the well-established science of cli-
mate change-still a formiぬbletask， though far les so 
than proving the causallink between a given climate impact 
and a distant entity's emissions. Further， even if est油lish-
ing the causal link between a flooding event and climate 
ma町 ChangeCan Do About Tort Law， 41 ENVTL. L. 1， 6 (2011) (concluding 
that climate change tort suits are unlikely to p配 vailon the meri臼)ー
9. Gerrard， supra note 8. 
10. Ewing & Ky皿r，supra note 8， at370 n.64 (“lndeed， atvirtually every stage 
of the 町村itionaldoctrinal analysis， climate change plaintiffs will need to 
invoke novel， rare， or other、Niseexceptional tort doctrines in order to pursue 
their claims."). 
11. 1he ca山 allink is becoming clearer， however. See discu日ioninfta Part I 
Further， some claims are far more抗raigh出 rward.See genera砂Kivalina.
12. See， e.g， ]ames Wilkins， 1s Sea Level Rise 'Foηeseeable"? Does 1t Matter?， 26 ] 
UND  USE & ENVTL. L. 437 (2011) 
13. It might even be easier than comprehensive regulation or legislation from 
EPA and the U.S. Congress， respectively. 
change remains necessary to prove legal cause， advances in 
the ab山tyto attribute a given impact to global warming is 
improving-at least enough to threaten more widespread 
civilliability. Indeed， local governments and developers are 
only two oft出hemany viable defendants t出ha抗tcan address t出he
impa筑ct臼sof climate change present叶l与y:予T，戸，
possibility for individual redress as well as greater oppo凹rt叫u-
nities to provoke climate-appropriate actions. 
To develop the argument for expanding climate torts， 
I look speci五callyat the impacts of sea-level rise (SLR) on 
coastal communities. SLR is an unquestionable byproduct 
of global warming. 1he SLR forecast is based on current 
observation of increased sea level as well as sound projec-
tions as to an increased rate of rise as we approach the mid-
dle and end of the century. With the growing knowledge of 
the dangers to U.S. coastlines， reasonable decisionmaking 
would militate in favor of changed management and devel-
opment practices at the coastline to adapt appropriately. 
In the absence of such changed behavior， the potential for 
liab山tyshould likewise increase. 
Exploring these alternative climate torts allows greater 
opportunities for individual recompense. 1his is signiι 
cant. Corrective justice at its core seeks to facilitate the 
making whole of the wrongfully injured-and it does so 
with the starting assumption that the arbiter is deciding 
among equals. 1he ability for plainti品 topursue their 
claims on equal footing and have their injury redressed 
has real as well as romantic resonance with the most vul-
nerable， generally speaking.1ラItmay also deliver tangible 
bene五tsfor the climate-vulnerable，16 who must continue to 
look to the courtroom for recourse.17 Climate torts based 
on responding to impacts may incite widespread change 
in behavior for those defendants who would， in response， 
incorporate that risk into their decisionmaking. Further， as
we learn of the most severe consequences to which it will be 
harder to adapt， increased threats of liability might induce 
more aggressive carbon-reduction measures. 
In Part 1， I argue that tort law has already proven that it 
is relevant to addressing climate change. I fIrst discuss the 
importance of swift and appropriate climate change adap-
tation， despite the lesser attention it has received relative 
14. Plaintiffs may also target emergency planners， engineers， and other infra 
町 uctureowners and operators. See gen仰 Jゆ]anMcDonald， Paying the Price 
0/ Adaptation: Compemation flr Climate Change 1mpacぉ，in ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY (Tim Bonyhady et al. eds.， 2010) 
1ラー See， e.g， Luke Cole， Environmental ]ustice Litigation: Another Stone in Da 
vids Sling， 21 FORDHAM U回L.].う23(1994) 
16. 1he term“climate-vulnerable" describes those individuals， communi日eS，or
nation-st町田 thathave a particularly acute exposure to pr回 entand fore 
casted climatic changes and are generally the least responsible for the an 
出 opogenicGHG em山 ionsat root. See genera砂Burkett，坤 ranote 2. 
17. 1he domestic and international politicallandscape has not been fruitful 
lndeed， civil recourse is arguably the greatest promise of tort law， more so 
than cor配 ctivejustice. See discu日 ioninftaPa叶 .B.1.;se genera砂Benjamin
C. Zipursky， Civil Recou円e，Not Corrective ]ustice， 91 GEO. L.]. 69う(2003)
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to efforts for mitigation through litigation.18 I then dis-
cuss the goals and mechanisms of tort law and argue that 
tort law is stil quite relevant to climate action， despite the 
courtroom setbacks and general skepticism about its e伍-
cacy and relevance. In fact， I suggest that if tort litigation 
moves beyond the Plaintiff v. Emitter paradigm， it might 
be an e百ectivevehicle for individual claimants as well as 
the adaptation endeavor generally. 
In Part 1， I survey the current law regarding local gov-
ernment and developer liability vis-a-vis coastal hazards. 
Here， I summarize the current understanding of SLR， 
which， based on the historical trend of the law regarding 
development， planning， and coastal hazards， should incite 
changed action on the part oflocal governments and devel-
opers. I also consider the impact climate forecasts might 
have on accelerating claims by coastal property owners， 
for example， aswell as producing better informed judicial 
interpretations of reasonable activity along the coastline. 
Finally， in Part 11， I conclude with a discussion of the 
climate tort's larger signi五cance.Like its conceptual prede-
cessor， environmental justice， 19 climate justice must look to 
critical “footholds" to succeed in the larger effort toward 
fair and ambitious responses to both the causes and con-
sequences of climate change. By providing several avenues 
for action using established tools， litigating climate change 
adaptation can secure a foundation in the present while 
allowing for upward momentum in the future. 
1. WhatTort Law Can DoAbout Climate 
Change Adaptation 
A. Climate Change Adattation 
Like climate change adaptation generally， the potential 
for litigation related to adaptation has received far les 
attention than mitigation. Yet， tort law is well-equipped 
in both purpose and function to address the challenges 
of adapting. Pursuing tort litigation can have the e百ectof 
minimizing the devastation of climate impacts while for-
tifying currently vulnerable individuals and communities. 
A survey of climate change cases五ledthrough the end of 
2009， however， demonstrated that no claims involving 
adaptation had been五ledduring the time that climate 
change-related litigation multiplied exponentially.20 And 
that absence appears unchanged.21 While cases brought 
18. 1his compounds the lesser focus it receives in other venues as well， including 
domestic policymaking and international negotiation 
19. See Maxine Burkett， Just Solutio削 toClimate Change，ラ6BUFF. L. REv. 169， 
188-92 (2008) 
20. See David Markell &] .B. Ruhl， An B押 iricalSunノワofClu制 teCh.仰 <geLitiga 
tion in the United Sta配人 40ELR 10644， 106ラo(July 2010) (defining climate 
change litigation as any piece of federal， state， tribal， or local administrative or 
judiciallitigation in which the party filings raise issu目 offact or law regarding 
the substance or policy of climate change causes and impacts and providing a 
chronicling of every climate change case filed through December 31， 2009) 
A recent review of the Columbia climate change chart sugges臼 thatthere have 
stil been no claims explicitly involving adaptation filed to date. See http:// 
www.climatecasechart.com (last visited Oct. 12，2012)ー
21. A review of Columbia's climate case chart， a comprehensive survey of 
national and international climate change cases 品led，did not yield any 
by large nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) against 
federal and state governments were typical in the survey， 
causes of action to require new or more-extensive adapta-
tion actions， like building a seawall， were not on thピ'litiga-
tion radar screen戸2Further tort actions， along with those 
concerning contract or property rights claims， were few. 
1he handful of tort actions tackled emitters using public 
nuisance theory. 1hey were quite public， spurring copious 
law review articles，23 discussions in more popular media，24 
and the anticipated 2011 Supreme Court decision in AEP. 
1he courts， however， have e百ectivelyslowed momentum for 
this kind of climate tort progressing to the merits phase.お
1here is increasing interest in understanding the 
potential liab山tyof local governments and other entities 
for acting or failing to act in response to climate change 
impacts.26 When damage from climate-related events occur 
or the need for preventive works becomes undeniable， the 
question of who will cover the substantial costs arises. In 
Australia， another common-law country， local and state 
governments have started to express concerns about expo-
sure to compensation claims.27 1hese bodies have demon-
strated reluctance to approve new developments without 
taking into account planning benchmarks for impacts such 
as SLR， al the while calling for increased attention to com-
pensation and liability issues.28 As one local council stated: 
“If current climate change predictions are realized . . . [iJt 
is inevitable that some property owners willlook for com-
pensation . . . itis critical that planning for the五nancial
implications of climate change， in terms of property com-
pensation， commence without delay戸9Indeed， there are 
numerous adaptation-related claims that are increasingly 
timely， and there is emerging evidence， from both climate 
scientists and engineers， that this should be a present-day 
concern for decisionmakers and developers alike. 
cases that fit the bill. See http://www.climatecasecchart.com.Itis pos 
sible that these cases are hidden elsewhere because they are either filed 
or classified as nonspecific property damage claims brought for unat-
tributed weather events 
22. Markell & Ruhl， supra note 20， at 106ラ1.1he authors explained that no 
case involved a claim regarding substantive adaptation measures， whereas 
over 40% of the cases focused on substantive mitigation measures 
23. See， e.g.， Douglas Ky皿r，What Climate Change Can Do About Tort La叫 41
ENVTL. L. 1 (2011); Randall S. Abate， Public N削仰ceSu出メげtheClim峨
/ωtice Movement: The Right Thing in the Right万me，8う高弘SH.L. REv. 197 
(2010); ]onathan Zasloff， The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reco削 tructingPublic 
Nuisance and Climate Change，ラ UCLAL. REv. 1827 (2008) 
24. Lawrence Hurley， Impact of 5，ψreme Court5 Gree幼 ouseGas Ruling Lルウ白
Be Felt in Other Cases， NヱTIMES，]une 21， 2011， http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire120 11106121121 greenwire-impact -of-supreme-courts-greenhouse-gas-
ruling-41463.html (last visited Oct. 26， 2012)ー
2ラー 5町 AEP，etc. But se Kivalina (claims including conspiracy and damages) 
26. Anecdotally， as the Director of the Center for Island Climate Adaptation 
and Policy (se genera砂http://www.islandclimatιorg)，one of the questions 
1 received frequently from planners and environmental NGO sta百， among 
others， was whether or not local governments might be held liable for their 
failure to build adaptive capacity in their communities. For a comprehensive 
discussion of increasing interest in potentialliabiliry in Australia， see Mc-
Donald， supra note 14 
27. McDonald， sψra note 14， at23ラー
28. Id 
29. Byron Shire Council， Submi日ion43， at 9， U.S. House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Climate Change， cited in McDonald， supra note 
14， at23ラ
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Possible adaptation-oriented actions are legion-from 
claims for failing to increase the height of seawalls to 
actions relating to inadequate flood-hazard mapping and 
inadequate government-owned infrastructure， such as 
dams and levees戸 Inaddition to lawyers engaging in a伍r-
mative adaptation planning， such as the development of 
real estate disclosure obligations， Prof. Michael Gerrard 
has identi五edmany other adaptation mechanisms deserv-
ing more legal attention. Reflecting areas for concern that 
engineers identi五edas early as 199スtheseadaptation mea-
sures include， among other things:自oodprotection; pro-
tecting buildings and infrastructure for rising water tables; 
strengthening structures to withstand higher wind loads; 
and modifying heating， ventilation， and air conditioning 
systems to withstand the worst heat waves.31 1he threat of 
tort liability may incite decisions to engage in this kind of 
planning and development， with expert execution. At the 
same time， poorly conceived adaptation policies themselves 
might cause damage for which decisionmakers would 
wisely anticipate tort litigation.32 
Ultimately， tort litigation has the power to determine 
the course of climate adaptation. Both acts and omissions 
in response to climate change impacts entailliability risks. 
As Ben Schueler explains: 
If the liability standards for failure to act imply higher 
risk than the standards applying to action， the system will 
stimulate the development of appropriate adaptation poli-
cies. If， on the other hand， the risk is higher for actions 
than it is in case of not acting， the system will discourage 
the taking of adaptation measures.33 
With the potential for tort law to steer the direction of 
climate preparedness， in al directions， those seeking to 
advance greater safety and well-being would do well to har-
ness tort liab山tyto stimulate more a百ectiveand aggres-
sive capacity-building. Tort law has the ability to五日 出c
vacuum that most public and private entities in the United 
Stat口 createby failing to engage responsibly in mitigation 
and adaptation， particularly at the nation's coastlines.34 
B. The Form and Function ofTort Law 
Despite its familiaritywith“complex， sprawling litigation戸ラ
many deem tort law and climate change an uncomfortable 
30. See， e.g.， In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation， 2012 WL  434377ラ
31. Michael B. Gerrard， What the Law and Lawyers Can and Cannot Do About 
Globallぬrming，16 SOUTHEASTERN EN、TL.L.]. 1，ラ3(2007) (Gerrard de 
rived this list from research conducted for engineers， who themselves are 
considering potential options to reduce the social and environmental threats 
climate change introduces. See ENGINEERING RESPONSE TO GLOBAL CLI-
MATE CHANGE: PLANNING A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (Rob 
ert G. Watts ed.， CRC Press 1997))ー
32. Ben Schueler， Govemmental L泌 iliワAnIncent.山メげAppropriateAdaptaー
tion?， inCLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds.， 
Edward Elgar 2011) 
33. Id. at 238. 
34. 1here are， of course， exceptions to the rule. See， e.g.， PlaNYC， http://www 
nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/home/home.shtml (last visited Sept. 6， 
2012). And there are real political hurdles in some states. See discussion of 
Nor巾tl出hCaro凶叫lina叫l':正心，旨'sS乱LRbi此1比，巧
3汚う Ew刑 ing&正Ky戸sa叫r巳"s川μtpr悶"n凹1旧ot匝e8， aιt370 
五t.Given the proper scope， however， tort law is perhaps 
uniquely prepared to do the most for substantial advance-
ment in climate change action. Although it is often limited 
to the present tense and binary-that is， addressing pr口ent
harm between plaintiff and defendant36ー itsreach is often 
far beyond the fInite parties named.37 Indeed， the primary 
goals of tort law suggest that its virtues are based in its 
ab山tyto resolve disputes between individuals while gal-
vanizing changed behavior amongst communities. In this 
section， I briefly discuss the goals of tort law， the mech-
anisms that allow tort law to address concerns from the 
atomized to the holistic， and I elaborate on its potential for 
signi五cantimpact in the climate arena. 
Two of the most-cited goals of tort law are compensation 
and deterrence.38 Compensation is generally backward-
looking， aiming to place the claimant in the position she/ 
he would have been in absent the tort. 1his is also under-
stood as the corrective justice goal of tort law. Deterrence is 
forward-looking and oriented toward the many who con-
stitute societ}司 t-large.391he aim is to prevent the named 
defendant as well as others similarly situated from engaging 
in the harmful activity. Tort liability， therefore， may trigger 
behavioral change that curbs the harm-producing， anti-
social activity. In combination， the threat of liability with 
the accompanying responsibility for compensation should 
motivate actors to make the right， lawful decisions.40 
1. Function-Corrective Justice and Other 
Virtues ofTort Litigation 
1hough subject to much greater nuance， corrective justice， 
broadly， isthe recti五cationof a harm wrongfully caused 
by one to another through a transfer of resources from the 
wrongdoer to the i吋ured.41In other words， individuals who 
are responsible for losses wrongfully incurred have a duty to 
repair those losses.42 Aristotle五rstde五nedit as a “transac-
tional justice" that deals with the fairness between two indi-
36. See， e.g.， Kysar， W古atClimate Change Can Do About Tort Law， supra note 
8， at11 (discussing then-]udge Benjamin Cardozo's account of tort law in 
Pal認raf[Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co.， 162 N.E. 99 (Nヱ1928])ー
37. See， e.g.， id. at 12 (discussing ]udge William S. Andrew's account of tort law 
in Palsgraf and stating that the enduring resonance of Palsgr.イhasmuch to 
do with the fact that both of its contrasting approaches remain alive and at 
work within tort jurisprudence，“to the great frustration of law students and 
scholars who seek doctrinal unifi口rmity")ーId.at 1う-
38. David A. Grossman， 1ぬrmzng印加 aNot-so-Rad.ωlIa匂，Tort-Based Cli 
mate Change Litiga白on，28 COLUM. ]. ENVTL. L. 1， 4 (2003). Other goals 
of tort law and loss-a11ocation systems genera11y include loss-spreading， the 
印 ncept州ustdesserts， and distributive justicι See Daniel A. Fa加 ，A勾 t-
ing to Climate Ch仰 'ge，Who Should Pay， 23 ]. UND  USE 8ιENVTL. L. 1， 
19 (2007). Perhaps most important to the intention of this Article， tort 
litigation may achieve regulatory change. See Giedre Kaminskaite-Salters， 
Climate Change Litigation in the UK Its長出ibility仰 dProsp叫ん inCLIMATE
CHANGE LIABILITY， at170 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds.， Edward 
Elgar 2011) and disc山山ninfta Part I.B.1. 
39. See Kaminskaite-Salters， supra note 38 
40. See Schueler， supra note 32， at237 
41. Ronen Perty， Corrective and Distributive ]ustice: From Aristotle to Modern 
Times今lzhakEnglard， 23 CAN. ].L. &] U回 S.233， 233 (2010)ー
42. A11an Beever， G川町tive]ustice and Pe円onalRespo削 ibilityin Tort Law， 28 
OXFO回].LEGAL STUD. 47ラ， 477 (2008) (discussing ]ules Coleman's defi-
nition of cor配 ctivejustice) 
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vidual and equal persons. 43 He observed that，“the law looks 
only to the distinctive character of the injury， and treats the 
parties as equal， ifone is in the wrong and the other is being 
wronged， and one inflicted injury and the other has received 
it戸4Corrective justice assumes an initial equality between 
the parti口 andaims to restore that equality whenever it is 
upset by a wrongful act.45 Litigation places two parties-
even with substantially different power and capacity in other 
arenas-on equal footing46 to address harms incurred by， 
for example， climate-related impacts. Importantly， losses to 
the integrity of property or the physical body are the clearest 
case for duty of repair and corrective justice and are espe-
cially pr口entin the climate ad乱ptationcontext.47 
In practice， the defendant would be held liable because 
fairness between the parties requires that the losses fal 
on the defendant rather than the claimant， irrespective of 
defendant's moral culpability.48 In other words， the defen-
danピsliab山tydoes not necessarily indicate moral failure 
on his or her part. Moral failure may or may not have 
occurred， but it is irrelevant. Instead， fairness and justice 
as between the two parties militate in favor of defendant 
repairing victim's losses by virtue of their relationship to 
one another and the rights and duties that inhere-not 
to some other subjective (ethical) standard.49 1his is very 
compelling， asit suggests that to hold a defendant devel-
oper responsible for a landowner's losses she/he need not 
be as morally culpable as a GHG emitter， for example， 
nor morally culpable at all.ラoGiven the developer's con-
struction expertise relative to the landowner-again， as 
an example-fairness would require that she/he make the 
plaintiff whole for i吋un口 defendantcaused. 
Central to the application of corrective justice， there-
fore， iscausation of the harm.ラ1Simply， was defendant's 
wrongful conduct both a cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause of plaintif's losses?52 1his analysis would be a sig-
43. See id. at 476. 
44. ARlSTOTLE， NICOMACHEAN ETHICS， at1132a2-a6 (David Ross trans.， Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1980)， quoted in Perry， supra note 41， at240 
4ラー 1d. at 1132a2うa27(stating that the“the judge restores equality") 
46. Of course， 1 do not mean to suggest that access to the courts is seamless 
1here are Iinancial and other hurdles that potential climate adaptation liti-
gants are certain to face. An exhaustive discussion on this point is beyond 
the scope of this Article; however， class actions and/or actions brought by 
environmental justice advocacy groups like the Center on Race， Poverty， 
and the Environment， who brought the Kivalina case， may present helpful 
models. See David Ros目1berg，The Causal Connection in M出sExp凶 ureCI山一
回 A'Public Law"陥削0/加 To付与町m，97 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984). 
47. Matthew Adler， Corre伽 e]ustice and Liabiliヮメげ Globallぬrming，1ラ U
PA. L. REv. 18う9，18う9(2007). In fact， Matthew Adler is quite skeptical of 
generalized claims against GHG emitters for environmental damage as a 
matter of corrective justice. He claims that these damages are not themselves 
losses to individuals' paradigmatically protected interests. He goes on to say， 
however:“'An exception would be the loss of acreage to coastal property 
owners， a quite direct result of sea-level rise." 1d. at 1861. 1his is the exact 
kind of claim 1 contemplate in this Article 
48. Beever， supra note 42， at494. 
49. 1d. at 492 
うO. 1his is also notable because it alleviates any concern with the possibility of 
strict liability being applied in these cases. 1 thank Robin Craig for raising 
this important consideration 
う1. Perry， supra note 41， at239-40 
う2. Adler， supra note 47， at 1860. Adler's skepticism about establishing a 
causallink between property damage and liability (id. at 1861) is relevant 
III五cantfeature of adaptation litigation that departs from 
tort litigation concerned with emissions reduction. 1hough 
discussed further in Part 1， it is important to note here-
as a matter of corrective justice theory-that a defendant's 
unreasonable action with respect to climate hazard pre-
paredness and its link to plaintif's harms will be much eas-
ier to prove， atleast in theory， than the causallink between 
a carbon emitter's actions and a given harm. 
As a goal of tort law， then， corrective justice allows for 
and justifies access to the courts for plaintifs impacted by 
climate change to pursue claims against those that have 
acted unreasonably in light of the specter of sea-level rise， 
increased wildfire or severe storm risks， and other climate 
impacts. To that end， the goal of civil recourse[日1is also 
relevant to and further justifies the pursuit of adaptation 
litigation. [54] Even if the tort system of civil redress is not an 
optimal system of deterrence or corrective justice， assome 
have argued， the ability for climate-i吋uredplainti品tohave 
access to avenues for repair is a core purpose of tort law.戸
Of course， the threat of tort litigation can have a power-
ful impact， even if a claim does not make it into the court-
room. With the uphill battle of public nuisance litigation 
and the general skepticism surrounding its viab山叩 there
have been many opportunities to contemplate the bene-
五tsof simply五lingclimate-related claims.56 As Be吋amm
only to defendant emitters and not， as 1 argue， defendant developer and/ 
or local government 
う3. Civil recourse is contrasted by some with corrective justice theory. See generー
alゆBenjaminC. Zipursky， Civil Recourse， Not Correct.附 ]ustice，91 GEO. 
L.].69ラ(2003)(arguing that civil recourse， not corrective justice， explains 
the concep臼 andprinciples embedded in our tort law and displayed in i臼
plain日正defendantstructure)ーBenjaminZipursky argues: 
1he state provides the plaintiff with a right of action against 
the defendant for damages or other relief only if the defendant 
has wronged the plaintiff in a manner specilied by tort law. In 
permitting and empowering plainti仔Sto act against those who 
have wronged them， the state is not relying upon the idea that 
a defendant has a pre-existing duty of repair. Instead， itis rely 
ing on the principle that plainti百swho have been wronged are 
entitled to some avenue of civil recourse against the tortfeasor 
who wronged them. 
1d. at 699. Related to the point above， the foundational role of the state 
in providing a means to press one's claims is cogently explained in Guido 
Calabresi 8ι A. Douglas Melamed， ProperワRules，Liability Rules， and 1n-
alienabiliワ OneView 0/ the Cathedral， 8ラHARV.L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
1hey state: 
Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two 
or more people， or two or more groups of people， itmust decide 
which side to favor. Absent such a decision， access to goods， ser 
vices， and li長 itselfwill be decided on the basis of “might makes 
right" -whoever is stronger or shrewder will win. Hence the fun-
damental thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting 
parties will be entitled to prevail . . . Having made its initial choice， 
society must enforce that choice. Simply setting the entitlement 
does not avoid the problem of "might makes right"; a minimum of 
state intervention is always nece日aty.
1d at 1090. 
ラ4. See discussion of]ohn c.P. Goldberg and Zipursky's scholarship in Ewing & 
Ky皿 f，5tψranote 8， 373-74 (2011) (discussing]ohn Goldberg & Zipursky's 
contention that tort law is a means of civil recourse or redress that may be a 
constitutionally protected due proc回 sright) 
ラー See Ewing & Kysar， supra note 8， at373. 
ラ6. See， e.g.， David B. Hunter， The 1mp占ωtzo削 0/Climate Change Litigation: 
Lμzt伊 tu仰t
CUMATE CHANGE (William c.G. Bu旧1江rn凹1S&正 Hari 孔M.Os叩Oらωk三弓<yed心s.，Cam n目
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Ewing and Douglas Kysar have delineated， those bene五ts
include， among other things， the ab山tyfor plaintiffs to 
tel their climate story as well as helping advocacy move-
ments， like the climate justice community，57 to organize 
themselves.ラ8 Of course， having a claim make it to the 
merits stage with successful resolution can resonate widely 
beyond the parties-including altering or halting the 
actions of the defendant in a particular case as well as al 
other similar entities. Perhaps the greatest potential benefIt 
of both successful and unsuccessful litigation is its abil-
ity to complement current regulation or accelerate more 
aggressive， climate-appropriate regulation. 
Tort law is arguably a vital complement to environmen-
tal regulation generally.59百lOmasMcGarity argues that 
society needs tort law to hold companies responsible for 
harms they have caused and fairly distribute the attendant 
losses.“Only through vigorous ex-ante implementation 
and enforcement of environmental statutes and equally 
vigorous ex post tort litigation，" McGarity argues，“will 
citizens receive the critical protections that both statutes 
and common law meant to provide戸o1his complement 
corrects for a regulatory system that is “easily controlled" 
by the very entities it is meant to control. Indeed， there is 
evidence that this kind of undue influence is occurring in 
local attempts to build adaptive capacity，61 further justify-
ing ex-post litigation. 
Perhaps more importantly， high-pro五lelitigation may 
also drive legislative action on adaptation and mitigation.62 
In the case of adaptation litigation， tort actions would stem 
from failures on the part of regulators to address potential 
harms from failing to prepare for climate change risks.63 
1his kind of litigation might be the most powerful means 
for energizing the nascent regulatory regime， far eclipsing 
even sustained lobbying of our decisionmakers. As climate 
scientist Myles Allen has incisively observed，“even the most 
impassioned eco-warrior has nothing on a homeowner faced 
bridge 2009) (arguing that just the acts of preparing， announcing，五ling，
advocating， and forcing a r口ponsehave significant impacts)ー
う7. See generalゆBurkett，sψra note 2. 
ラ8. Ewing & Kysar， supra note 8， at373 
ラ9. See general，ウ1homasO. McGarity， Regulat.刷出，dL出 gati即，:Compたmen
却?ヴylおoκL必メ斤IrEnv仰 n附F
60. Id. at 372-73. 
61. 1he 1ntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1PCC) defines "adaptive 
capacity" as the“the ability or potential of a system to respond successfully 
to climate variability and change." R.]工Kleinet al.， Inter-Relatio削 hipsBe-
tweenA押印tionand Mitigat.ω" in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 1MPAcTs， AD-
APTATION， AND VULNERABILITY， CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REpORT OF THE 1NTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 74ラー77(M.L. Parry eds.， Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) 
1he role of developers in the legislation that initially forbade consider-
ation of SLR in coastal policy in North Carolina is indicativ<ιSeeWadeRaw 
lins， North Carolina Lawmakers Reject Sea Level Rise Predictions， REUTERS， 
]uly 3， 2012， available at http://www.reuters.com/articleI2012/07/03/us-
usa-northcarolina-idUSBRE86217I20 120703 (reporting that the General 
Assembly “[b ]acked by real estate developers， passed a law requiring that 
projected rates of SLR be calculated on historical trends and not include 
accelerated rates of increase"); se also disc出 sioninfta Part 11. 
62. McDonald， supra note 14， at 241; se also Kaminskaite-Salters， supra 
note 38， at 170 (arguing that one aim of litigation is to achieve regula 
tory change). 
63. Kaminskaite-Salters， Slそpranote 38， at170 
with negative equity."64 As the physical and personal costs of 
climate change continue to rise steeply， the value of slowing 
or halting the root causes may become painfully clearer. 
2. Form一一TheTort of Negligence 
1he tort of negligence will be the most relevant claim in 
climate ad乱ptationlitigation. 1he general query will look 
something like the following: Has x defendant acted rea-
sonably in light of the known risks of climate change when 
acting or failing to act， thus causing plaintif's alleged harm? 
1he four elements for proving negligence are establishing 
a duty， breach， causation， and damages. 1his is standard 
across claims between individuals and individual entities as 
well as large groups of similarly situated plainti品 against
one or many defendants， asin class actions. Multiple defen-
dants and elements of uncertaint予 unpromisinghallmarks 
of emissions reduction litigation， are not necessarily signiι 
cant hurdles to successful adaptation claims on the merits. 
Adaptation litigation might face the same criticisms. 
It is important to make clear at the outset， however， that 
these characteristics of climate-related litigation should 
not be dispositive. First， tort law 吋ectsthe notion that 
individual entities can avoid responsibility for harms negli-
gently produced by more than one negligent actor. If they 
act in concert and/or produce a single， indivisible harm， 
an individual defendant may stil be liable， assuming 
that plainti品 proveal other elements of the negligence 
tort.の Further，with regard to uncertainty， the system of 
civil justice has never required 100% certainty-or even 
ラ2%certainty-in assessing risks or establishing causal 
links.6 Legal scholars and practitioners should not dismiss 
outright nor prematurely confess to tort law's inadequacy 
and irrelevance67 when assessing the potential of adapta-
tion-related tort litigation just because negligence claims 
place the inherently complex science and politics of climate 
change in the courtroom. 
C. Moving Beyond the 
With al that tort law can do about potential harms that 
climate change risks producing， itwould behoove those 
64. Myles Allen， L泌 iliヮβrClima町 Ch仰 'te:Will It Ever Be Possible加 Sue
An少one斤rDamaging the Climate?， 421 NATURE (Feb. 27， 2003) (introduc 
ing the "attribution problem" and arguing that the uncertainty that inheres 
in attributing a severe weather event to climate change can be rigorously 
quantified for purposes of establishing liability) 
6ラー RESTATEMENT σHI回)TORTS ~C18; se also Daniel A. Farber， Climate Jus 
tice， 110 MICH. L. REV. 98う， 992(2012) 
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS ~431; se also Ewing & Kysar， Slψra note 
8， at420 n.2ララ(“Tothe extent that there is rrade-off between stability and 
predictability on the one hand， and reasonableness and responsiveness on 
the other， tort law may by its nature be more comfortable than， say， contract 
or property law with sacrificing some certainty in exchange for propriety."); 
Daniel A. Farber， Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay， 23 ]. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 1，7 (2007) 
67. See， e.g.， Ewing & Kysar， Slψra note 8; se also Kysar， W古atClimate Change 
Can Do About Tort Lauノ，Slψra note 8， at 3 (arguing that beyond indirect 
effects， tort law is unlikely to play a substantial role in the ultimate effort to 
reduce GHGs， compensate climate change victims， or otherwise implement 
legal r口ponsesto the global warming problem). 
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seeking a remedy for climate impacts to move beyond 
defendants in the business of carbon emissions. 1hough 1 
have argued elsewhere that there is va1ue and merit to the 
claims against carbon emitters，68 there is perhaps greater 
possibi1ity in pursuing other defendants cu1pab1e for cli-
mate-related harms-defendants that are not a1so su旬ect
to the m司orconceptua1 and practica1 hurd1es to suing 
emitters for climate-related harms. Jan McDona1d identi-
fIed three m司orimpediments to claims against emitters 
based on individua1 property damage.69 1hey are: (1) the 
di伍cu1tyin proving that past emissions constituted a 
breach of duty at that time， particu1arly if they occurred 
before the early 1990s; (2) the challenge of proving the 
causa1 connection between those emissions and the harms 
suffered; and (3) for p1ainti品 seekingprompt payment of 
compensation， the signi五cantdelay they wou1d encounter 
in 1ight of the number of parties and comp1ex relationships 
between emitters and their carbon emissions.70 
By considering a1ternative defendants-1ike property 
developers and 10ca1 governments71-claimants can side-
step al of these m司orhurd1es. In essence， actions against 
developers and 10ca1 governments will not invo1ve emis-
sions， but rather decisions made a10ng the coastline or in 
wi1d五re"red zones，" for examp1e. Estab1ishing the causa1 
1ink between those decisions and the harm p1aintiffs 
allege will be easier. Attributing extreme weather events 
to climate change， the most di伍cu1tand technically 
underdeveloped element of climate science， will occur 
at the stage of estab1ishing defendant's breach of duty， 
rather than estab1ishing the causa1 1ink between defen-
danピsemissions and p1aintif's harms， as is required in 
the carbon tort. 1 suggest that demonstrating the unrea-
sonab1eness of defendant's actions in 1ight of the great 
risks climate change presents will be a much 10wer bar for 
an adaptation p1aintiff to clear.72 
Relevant to the p1ainti品 contemp1atedin this argument 
for ad乱ptation1itigation， itis worth a1so noting that the 
68. Burkett， sψra note 2; se also Burkett， Climate Reparations， 10 MELBOURNE 
]. INT'L L ラ09(2009). Further， particularly with advances in end-to-end 
attribution of severe climate and weather events and carbon emissions， hold-
ing current emitters liable for the actual impact of their emissions is "at least 
conceptually straightforward." Allen， supra note 64. 
69. McDonald， supra note 14， at242. 
70. Id. at 242-43 
71. McDonald also ponders the liability potential of emergency services agen-
cies and infrastructure owners and operators. McDonald， supra note 14， 
at 241. Real自 国tebrokers might also be subject to increased liability. See 
discussion infra. 
72. In fact， the more di伍culti日間 arethe antecedent ones-defining a duty 
to which potential defendants might be held and identifying the actions 
(or inactions) that reasonable governments or developers might take to dis 
charge that duty. 1here are duties that are “easier" to identi今(Ifyou build 
something， you must do it well to manage reasonably anticipated risks.) 
And there a配“tougher"duty qu回 tions(What is a reasonable time frame 
for which to plan? How do you frame the duty so that the well-intentioned 
decisionmakers are not penalized if they make the wrong decision， even 
if based on best available science? When is coastal retreat the only right 
answer?)ー1hesecritically important qu回 tionsa配 beyondthe scope of this 
Article， but are叫
【Un町C昨川ι却郎u取仰仰口znσ:Local Govemment and Devel，ψer Liabiliσ orFai!.吋 to Adapt， 
GEORGE MASON L. REv. (ゐrthcoming).1 thank Robin Craig for raising 
these important considerations 
promise of Native Vil勾eof厄"va占nav. ExxonMobi[73 is出
V刊er町yp1ain立凶ti百sin K厄lvalinaand the配 claims t出ha抗tt出he可ymake. 
Whi1e the defendants are the fami1iar carbon emitters， the 
p1ainti品 seeka remedy that the Clean Air Act (CAA)l4 can-
not provide: damages. In stark contrast to the overall skep-
ticism about tort's e伍cacywith respect to climate-related 
claims， Doug Kysar's ana1ysis of the Ktvalina case high1ights 
the promise of adaptation 1itigation. Kysar argues that of al 
the climate change tort cases五1ed，the suit in 厄"valinawas 
the best p1ed戸1hep1ainti品 seekmonetary recover予rather
than emissions 1imits， for preexisting， 0伍cia1estimates of 
the costs to relocate their village due to the 10s of coasta1 
bu長rsresu1ting from climate-related storms and rising 
seas. Kysar exp1ains:“In essence， they are asking the court 
to reinscribe a classica11ibera1 conception of property rights 
in which the interest of 1andowners in the use and enjoy-
ment of property is protected."76 Yet， even more compelling 
from a climate justice perspective， Kivalina is a paradigmatic 
examp1e of climate justice in the courts by virtue of its p1ain-
ti品 andthe nature of their claims. Kiva1ina has a1most 400 
residents， 97% of whom are A1aska Natives. 1he village is 
traditiona1 Inupiat and is 10cated at the tip of a six-mi1e-1ong 
barrier reef. 1he storms and waves are destroying the 1and 
with such severity that the entire community must relo-
cate further in1and. As Kysar states， the village represents 
“extremely sympathetic [p1ainti品 whoJare among the most 
vu1nerab1e peop1e in the world to climate change whi1e a1so 
being among the 1east responsib1e for it."7 P1ainti品 willstil 
encounter the three m司orimpediments to claims against 
emitters， outlined above; however， the strengths of Ktvalina 
suggest that a more-inclusive understanding of the“climate 
tort" can ga1vanize and五ne-tuneaction to adapt to antici-
pated impacts and， perhaps， expedite emissions reductions 
as well. 
1. Local Government and Developer 
Liability for SLR Impacts-Precedent 
and Possibilities 
Recent actions by North Caro1ina 1awmakers demonstrate 
the need for a broader conception of climate change 1iti-
73. 1his case is the remaining public nuisance tort claim that is stil viable， de 
spite the holding in AEP. Complaint for Damages， Native Village of Kiva-
lina v. ExxonMobil Corp.， 08-CV-1138 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.， 663 F. Supp. 2d 863， 39 ELR 20236 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009)ー
74. 42 U.S.c. ~~7401-7671q ， ELR STAT. CAA ~~101-608. 
アラー Ky皿 f，5tそpranote 8， at24. 
76. Ky皿 f，5upra note 8， at2ラー1hisappeal to property rights echoes intimations 
of the strengths of these kinds of claims by Adler， supra note 47， at1861， 
and ]onathan Adler， Global W台rming:A Dialogue-Should Victims Receive 
Compensationえ23PERC Reports 1 (Mar. 200う)， available at http://www. 
perc.org/ articles/ articleラ32.php (last visited Sept. 2ラ， 2012) (arguing that 
for a property rights violation to exist， climate change need not be cata 
strophic， nor even produce more costs and bene血s;rather， dimate impacts 
need only impose identifiable costs on those who have not consented to the 
imposition of such costs). 1he property rights approach is not without its 
own challenges. Property rights appeals may present a significant hurdle to 
climate adaptation effor臼 ifproperty owners claim that preventive regula-
tion or preventive works constitute an uncompensated taking 
77. Ky皿 r，supra note 8， at24. 
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gation-particularly， litigation directed toward purpose-
ful as well as benign inaction in an era of climate change. 
1hough its coastlines are identi五edas hotspots for SLR， 
with rates three to four times faster than the global 
average，78 North Carolina's General Assembly a伍rma-
tively chose to ignore the state's particular vulnerability to 
rapid SLR predicted for the state's coastline and thousands 
of square miles of low-lying land，l9 1he panel of scientists 
advising the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commis-
sion， a state policy panel， recommended that coastal com-
munities plan for roughly 39 inches of SLR by 2100.80 1he 
recommendation “drew backlash" from NC-20， a coastal 
economic development group that questioned the scien-
tihc basis for the recommendation and argued that such 
policy would undermine “出ecoastal economy， raise insur-
ance costs， and turn thousands of square miles of coastal 
property into flood plains that could not be developed戸I
1he General Assembly， sympathetic to these arguments， 
initially prohibited any use of prospective sea-level fore-
casts， requiring the use of historical data instead. One dis-
senting legislator said in response:“By putting our heads 
in the sand literally， we are not helping property owners. 
We are hurting them. We are not giving them informa-
tion they might need to protect their proper早 Ignorance
is not bliss. It's dangerous戸2 While the五nalpiece of 
legislation retreated from outlawing al consideration 
of SLR in the state， itstil prohibits state agencies from 
implementing policies based on sea level unti1201683-a 
period of time that might be critical for North Carolina's 
coastal resiliency. 
Not al governing bodies are similarly repelled by the 
science of climate change and the forecasted impacts. In 
fact， many local authorities that are not currently build-
ing adaptive capacity in their communities are likely not 
doing so for more benign reasons， including lack of infor-
mation and strained human and五nancialresources. Yet， 
the North Carolina story remains relevant， asit highlights 
the key role that both decisionmakers and developers have 
in determining the level of climate preparedness individu-
als and communities can achieve and， conversely， just how 
vulnerable ill-advised policy renders them. Adaptation liti-
gation is a means of empowering those that are vulnerable 
78. See Asbury H. Sallenger ]r. et al.，}五Uゐ<potof Accelera町dSea-Level Rise on the 
At，的 ticCo出 tofNorthAmerica， NATURE CUMATE CHANGE， ]une 24， 2012， 
doi: 1 0.1 038/nclimatelう97，http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ 
ncurrent/fig.tab/nclimate1う97jt.html (last visited Oct. 26， 2012). 1he 
study authors explain that SLR superimposed on storm surge， wave run-up， 
and set-up will increase the vulnerabiliry of coastal cities to flooding， and 
beaches and wetlands to deterioration 
79. Wade Rawlins， North Carolina Lau府 zake円 RejectSea Level Rise Predictions， 
REUTERS， ]uly 3， 2012， http://www.reuters.com/articleI20 12/07 /03/us-usa 
northcarolina-idUSBRE86217I20120703 (last visited Oct. 26， 2012)ー
80. M. 1he panel based 旧民comm目ldationon seven scientific studi出ー
81. M. 
82. M. 
83. See Andrew M. Ballard， North Carolina Govemor Allows Bill on Sea-Lωd 
Change加 BecomeLaw， DAILY ENV'T REP.， Aug. 3， 2012. 1he law cals on 
the state Coastal Resources Commission to update a March 2010 scientific 
panel旨reporton estimated SLR. Lawmakers will receive the updated report 
by March 1， 2016， and rates of sea-level change may not be established for 
state regulatory purposes until ]uly 1， 2016. N.C. Sess. Laws 2012-202. 
by allowing them， on equal footing， to address those that 
put them in harm's way. It might also spur critical “protec-
tive works"84 that would minimize the risk of further dam-
age to people and proper早1heassociated claims would 
not be“exotic"85; indeed， they would explore and expand 
upon the more run-of-the-mill actions tort law has demon-
strated comfort in addressing-facilitating repair， recon-
struction， and protection for property owners subject to the 
negligent acts of others. 
A. SLR-Forecast and (Un)certainty 
1he current climate science on SLR establishes a clear link 
between the phenomenon and the anthropogenic emis-
sions fueling climate change.86 1hat fact， along with the 
strong science on observed SLR and modeled increases 
in the rate of SLR，87 make SLR one of the most obvious 
targets for aggressive adaptation.8 Researchers have also 
carefully documented and summarized for policymakers 
the impacts of SLR， including exacerbation of coastal ero-
sion， storm surge， inundation， and other coastal hazards 
that threaten vital infrastructure， settlements， and facili-
ties that support coastal communities.89 1he Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)， in its summary 
84. See McDonald， sψra note 14， at240. 
8ラー See Kysar， supra note 8， at1 (stating that by forcing courts to confront qu目
tions of harm， causation， and responsibiliry that lie at the frontiers of science 
and ethics， climate change lawsuits hold potential to move the bar for what 
counts as“exotic" in the domain of tort) 
86. See， e.g.， Martin Vermeer & Stefan Rahn日storf，Global Sea Level Linked 
to Global Temperature， 106 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences (PNAS) 21う27-32， http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/1 0.1 073/pnas 
090776ラ106(last visited Oct. 24， 2012); se also Grossman， supra note 38， 
atう1hisis not the only impact that is， for the most part， linked to anthro 
pogenic climate change with litle controversy. See， e.g.， Anthony]. McMi-
chael & Keith B.G. Dear， Climate Change: f加 ιf加 lth，and Longer Ho-
rizons， 107 PNAS 21， 9483-84， May 2ラ， 2010，http://www.pnas/org/cgi/ 
doi/1O.1073/pnas.1004894107 (describing the limits to human tolerance 
to heat that will render much of the eartlis surface uninhabitable by 2030; 
“Climate change， ultimately， is a threat for biological health and survival.") 
Further， the heat and drought experienced in Texas is 20 times more likely 
than it would have been in the 1960s. ]ustin Gillis， GloballぬrmingMak，訂
正加t陥附 M附 Lik，の5卸み Finds，NヱTIMES，]uly 10， 2012， h叩// 
www.nytimes.comI2012/07/11 / science/ earth/ global-warming-makes-heat-
waves-more-likely-study-fìnds.html?_r~O (last visited Oct. 26， 2012)ー
1his more concrete level of certainry with regard to climate change and 
SLR is quite important from a torts perspective. Schueler argues that tort 
law does not really provide strong incentive to pursue adaptation measures 
Schueler， sψra note 32. While Schueler's proposition may be generally cor 
rect， it does not necessarily hold for SLR or other climate impacts for which 
attribution and identification are improving dramatically. 
87. See general，ゆMichielSchaeffer et al.， Long-Term Sea-Level Rise J，ゅルd今
1.5" C and2" ClぬrmingLevels， NATURE CUMATE CHANGE， ]une 24， 2012， 
doi:10.1038/nclimatelラ84，available at http:/八NWW・nature.com/nclimate/
journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate1う84.html(explaining， among other 
things， that about one-half of the 21st century SLR is already committed to 
as a result of past emissions) 
88. Of course， 1 do not mean to suggest that finding the best policy mechanisms 
to adapt to SLR will be easy. Hawaii's recent di伍cultyin adopting， much 
les incorporating， an S 
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for po1icymakers， has exp1icitly stated that adaptation is 
necessary to address the impacts of warming that are now 
unavoidab1e due to past emissions.90 1hey further state that 
one way of increasing adaptive capacity is by introducing 
consideration of climate impacts in development p1anning 
by including adaptation measures in 1and use p1anning 
and infrastructure design， among other things.91 Simp1y 
considering these recommendations might be enough for a 
government to discharge a duty to act reasonab1y in man-
aging and developing U.S. coastlines ir口pectiveof 1inger-
ing uncertainties in the science-though more concerted 
action will1ikely be nec口sary.92
More readi1y， scientists are beginning to 1ink other 
severe weather events with climate change. With snow 
storms， tornadoes，自oods，heat， and drought a百ecting
hundreds of millions globally， 2011 registered as another 
“unusually active" year for extreme weather events. In 
response， Nationa1 Center for Atmospheric Research 
scientist Kevin Trenberth stated that al of these events 
have an anthropogenic component to them. He further 
estimated that human activity is responsib1e forラー10%
of overall atmospheric conditions behind today's globa1 
weather patterns.93 Unti1 quite recently， scientists resisted 
a伍rmatively1inking observed weather with globa1 warm-
ing， and were 10ath to attach concrete numbers to those 
occurrences.94 With advances in statistica1 too1s， climate 
models， and computer power，“attribution of extremes is 
hard-but it is not impossib1e."95 Further， whi1e theラー10%
increase sounds small， Trenberth exp1ains:“1his is exactly 
the sort of thing that breaks records， that breaks 1evees， and 
potentially helps Lake Pontchartrain spread out over New 
Orleans."% By way of ana1ogy， climate scientists are now 
comparing the globa1 climate to 10aded dice that still1ands 
on one from time to timeア Ourclimate now has a clear 
bias toward increasing1y more erratic weather events that is 
essentially irreversib1e，98 including inexorab1e SLR.99 As the 
1inkages between climate change and severe events become 
even more concrete， the expectation-and perhaps even 
duty-for 10ca1 entities and other relevant private parties 
will be to take those impacts into account when making 
decisions a百ectingvu1nerab1e areas. 
90. Id. at 17. 
91. Id. at 19. 
92. Schaeffer et al.， Slそpranote 87. For further discussion of what might consti-
tute acting with reasonable or due care under climate change circumstances， 
see Burkett， supra note 72 
93. ]拘悶nChe目叩mnick三ら，GHGs 'Load 加 D白Z附C〆e'下rEx云M加t町併r陀r仰m附 e1恥F粍恥長匂加'at加 r， Sc仰zen計問t;凶 Saのry，
E8ιE NEWS， Sept. 8， 2011 
94. See Quirin Schiermeier， Ext町 me Measures: Can Violent Hurricanes， 
Floods，仰 dDrough訂 BePinned on Climate Change? Scientists Are Begin 
nzng白 SayYes， 477 NATURE 148， Sept. 8， 2011， http:!八NWW.nature.com/
newsI20111110907/full/477148a.html (last visited Oct. 26， 2012) 
9ラ Id(quoting Gavin Schmidt， climate modeler at NASA Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies)ー事Thilethere have been significant advances in attribution， it is 
important to note that many climate scientists remain skeptical about the en 
deavor. Id 1his does not， however， significantly impact the argument 1 make 
here largely based on SLR， for which the link to global warming is quite clear. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See Susan Solomon et al.， Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide 
Emissio削， 106PNAS 6， Feb 10，2009， at1704-09. 
99. Id. at 1707 
1here remain uncertainties as to degree of impact for al 
climate-related events， particu1arly at the sca1e of regiona1 
and 10ca1 impact.10 1hese uncertainties， which may mean 
that future changes in SLR， for examp1e， cou1d be worse 
than currently projected，10 admitted1y present formidab1e 
obstacles to error-proof p1anning. 1hey do not， however， 
weigh in favor of fai1ing to embark on bui1ding adaptive 
capacity at a11. 10 
B. An Overview of Local Government and 
Developer Liability for Harms Suffered by 
Coastal Landowners 
Among the many claims coasta1 1andowners might make 
relevant to SLR impacts， the most common claims will 
1ikely relate to 10ss of coasta1 1and， damages to bui1dings 
and other infrastructure， and persona1 injury.103 Landown-
ers might a1so make claims seeking further damages for 
preventive measures that have been or shou1d have been 
taken.削 Researchersfrom various discip1ines and sectors 
have a1ready documented the tangib1e economic costs of 
severe events at the coastline.1Oラ 1hemost compelling data 
show that costs of cleanup after an unmitigated disaster far 
eclipse the cost of instituting preventive measures， some-
times by a factor of 4:1， ifnot far more.106 Indeed， hur-
ricane 10ss-prevention and preparedness measures taken 
by certain po1icyho1ders prior to Hurricane Katrina pre-
sented an up-front cost of $2.5 million， but avoided $500 
million in 10sses.107 With this magnitude of potentia11oss， 
and the great possibi1ity for cost-saving through preven-
tion， 1itigation spurring more protective measures is even 
more compelling. 1his section exp10res the current trends 
in the 1aw on 10ca1 government and developer 1iabi1ity for 
coasta1 hazards that are ana1ogous to or will be exacerbated 
by climate-related SLR. 
100.5，町QuirinSchiermeier， The Real Holes in Climate Science， 463 NATURE 284， 
]an. 20， 2010， available at http://www.nature.com/newsI2010/100120/ 
full/463284a.html (last visited Oct. 7， 2012) 
101. See， e.g.， ]ean-Marie Macabrey， Researchers 1ぬrnThat Sea Levels Wil Rise 
Much Faster Than Expe巾ぷ E8ιE NEWS CLIMATEWlRE， Mar. 11， 2009， 
http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewireI2009/03/1111 (last visited Oct. 
26，2012) (reporting that SLR by 2100 will be greater than the IPCC's pre-
diction， and also that the rate of increase after 2100 will be faster than before 
2100)“We are at the very least in the worst case scenario of the IPCC." Id 
102. See Schiermeier， supra note 100. In fact， Quirin Schiermeier explains that al 
of the problems (with downscaling models) do not make regional simula-
tions worthless， aslong as their limitations are understood. Id Planners at 
the local and nationallevels are alr四 dyusing regional simulations. Id 
103. David Grossman introduces these possible claims in his provocative， early 
piece on climate-related tort litigation. Grossman， Slそpranote 38， at16. 
104.Id 
10う Se町'eg'白 昨'{l，砂ウ R百 Z必li仰r
AND CER虹ES(ο20ω09引)(n凹1旧O目I口mgt出haιtdes叩pl山I匝et出hec印ompellinge町Vlιde叩nc臼epr陀es民en配1江te吋d，
nearly al U.S. coastal ci日目 andtowns lack adequate land use requiremen臼
and building code standards to realize the savings)ー
106.Id at 1. 
107.Id 
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1. Local Government Liability 
Over the 1ast 40 years， 10ca1 governments have adopted 
flood 10ss-reduction measures that generally fal into two 
categories: structura1 measures and nonstructura1 mea-
sures.108 Structura1 measures include dykes， dams， 1evees， 
and stormwater systems. Nonstructura1 measures describe 
bui1ding codes， 1and use p1anning，自oodpredictions， 
and warning systems， among other measures.109 Lawsuits 
against 10ca1 governments due to flood or erosion 10sses 
alleged1y due to these measures are instructive to assess 
10ca1 government 1iab山tywith respect to SLR-associated 
risks.10 Even without the potentially catastrophic dam-
age of SLR on the coastlines， advances in techno1ogy that 
allow for more accurate hazard prediction have a1ready pre-
sented more directed 1iabi1ity qu口tions.As James Wi1kins 
frames the question in his persuasive article on SLR and 
10ca1 government 1iabi1ity:11 
If a local government entity has control over planning and 
zoning decisions and possesses special knowledge about 
the likelihood and severity of risks， and it allows develop-
ment that results in damage or injury from natural haz-
ards that it knew or should have known about， can it be 
found liable for damages?112 
Whi1e the answer is not straightforward， as there are 
many factors that influence the ana1ysis and outcome，113 
the frequency with which the question is asked， coup1ed 
with more sophisticated means of prediction， shou1d be of 
great concern to 10ca1 governments. Further， prior case 1aw 
suggests that certain climate-related claims are quite fami1-
iar and do not fal in government's favor.14 
1he current trend in 10ca1 government 1iab山tydi百ers
depending on the measures emp1oyed. Here， 1 briefly take 
108. See genera砂]onA. Kusler， A Comparative Look at Public Liabi占ヮβrF，ゐod
正{azardMitigation， ASSOCIATION OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS FOUN-
DATION (2009) 
109.1d. at 4 
110. Some suits involve landowner claims against governments alleging that 
floodplain regulations constitute an unconstitutional taking of private 
property. 1hese sui臼 arerelevant to actions that local governments are 
willing to take at the coastline， and often have a chilling e百-ecton more 
aggressive legislation. See， e.g.， Douglas Codiga et al.， Climate Change and 
Regulatory Takings in Coastal Hawaii， CENTER FOR ISLAND CLIMATE AnAP-
TATION AND POLICY (2011). Recent developments in Australia further high-
light the admittedly di伍cultdecisions local governments face in attempts 
to address SLR. See， e.g.， Vikki Campion， Sea Lω'el Rise Planning Clause 
Dunψed， THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (AUSTRALIA)， ]uly 4， 2012， http://www 
dailytelegraph.com.au/property/sea-level-rise-planning-clause-dumped/ 
story-e6仕eztO-122641667ラ787(last visited Oct. 26， 2012) (d目 cribingthe 
removal of a controversial clause on planning documents that labeled the 
homes of thousands of coastal property owners in SLR danger). On the 
one hand， local governments face claims of devaluation of proper日目 and
increased insurance premiums. On the other hand， they might risk action 
for failing to disclose SLR dangers. A more comprehensive discussion of the 
takings hurdle is beyond the scope of this Article 
111. See generalゆ事叫三inS，5tψranote 12. 
112. Wilkins， supra note 12， at440. 
113. Factors include whether there is a statute requiring government to avoid 
planning decisions that result in flooding， the level of knowledge govern-
ment po日ess回 aboutpotential hazards and defとnsesavailable to govern-
ment， and， perhaps the most obvious， sovereign immunity and discretion 
ary五mctionimmunity. See id. at 441. 
114. See generalゆid.
the measures in rurn and summarize the五ndingsregard-
ing 1ikelihood ofliabi1ity， starting fIrst with structura1 mea-
sures， which themselves are intended to reduce flood 10sses. 
Courts have often found 10ca1 governments 1iab1e for flood 
and erosion 10sses related to structura1 measures. 1ラ1hemost
successfu1 flood related suits have invo1ved government 
infrastructure that has increased natura1 hazards or hazard 
risks.16 Speci五cally，if a government has itself constructed 
dams that collapsed due to inadequate design， construc-
tion， operation， or maintenance， courts have found them 
strictly 1iab1e to p1ainti品 allegingharm.117 1hey have a1so 
been held 1iab1e for neg1igence in the design， construction， 
maintenance， and operation of groins， seawalls， 1evees， 
bridges， and stormwater faci1ities that increased flooding 
or erosion on private properties.18 In his comparative 100k 
at pub1ic 1iabi1ity for flood hazard mitigation， J on Kus1er 
exp1ains that these structura1 measures cause increased 10ss 
in some instances with poor design， construction， mainte-
nance， and operation， but a1so when design frequencies are 
exceeded.19 1his kind of error in design frequency is par-
ticu1arly relevant in the SLR context， asforecasted impacts 
of SLR will a1most certain1y exceed the interva1 of events 
for which the structure was designed. 
Courts have held governments 1iab1e for 10sses in fewer 
cases invo1ving inadequate flood warnings and inadequate 
dissemination of flood information， as well as other non-
structura1 measures. 1hese cases are generally 1es success-
fu1 because of exp1icit 1iab山tyexemptions in state tort 
claims statutes， the notion that these measures constitute 
“bene五ts"that government has no duty to provide， and 
because many of these measures， such as weather predic-
tion， invo1ve a great degree of discretion. 120 Speci五cally，and 
most relevant to this Article， governments have not been 
held 1iab1e for weather and flood forecasts， nor have they 
been held 1iab1e for inadequate flood maps.121 1hey have， 
however， been held 1iab1e in a few cases for inadequate dis-
semination of weather or自oodforecast information.山
P1anning and regu1atory decisions made by 10ca1 govern-
ments are a1so quite relevant to a discussion of adaptation 
1itigation. With respect to 1iab山tyfor regu1ations， some 
courts have held governments 1iab1e for neg1igence when 
11ラー Kusler，Slそpranote 108， at4. 
116. 1d. at 13. Seealw Wilkins， sψra note 12， at493 (discussing the 1n re Katアzna
litigation). 
117. Kusler， sψra note 108， at 4. See also McDonald， supra note 14， at 244 
(discussing possible claims in Australian courts). McDonald suggests that 
liability may also arise in cases where erection of structures in one place cre-
ates a reasonable expectation that it will also be built elsewhere. Failure to 
undertake such works could give rise to liability damage that occurred that 
could have been prevented. 1d. 
118. Kusler， Slそpranote 108 
119. 1d. Generally， design frequency describes the design decisions made based on 
a日umptionsabout the frequency and magnitude of catastrophic events over 
a glven t1me仕ame.For further discussion of design frequencies and climate 
change in the transportation context， see Michael D. Meyer， Design StantUzη必
斤rUs. Tramportation 1n戸出truc郎町 The1mp占ωtzo削 0/Climate Ch仰 <ge，
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES， Publica 
tions， available at onlinepubs. trb.orgl onlinepubs/sr/sr290Meyer. pdf 
120. Kusler， Slψra note 108， atラー
121. 1d. atラー Governmentshave been held liable in a few cases for inadequate 
emergency management act1vlt1es. 
122.1d. 
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they issue regulatory permits for buildings or other struc-
tures， or for subdivisions that cause increased flood hazards 
on other proper早1231his is signi五cant，as it suggests that 
adjacent prope町 ownersalong the coastline m可 havea 
viable action against local governments for issuing permits 
or failing to adequately regulate if those actions produce 
losses more frequent and/or more severe as a result of SLR 
impacts. Courts have also broadly supported regulations 
that exceed the minimum Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) standards， including flood-protec-
tion elevations that exceed FEMA requirements， floodway 
designations， and beach and river setbacks. 1his is also sig-
III五cant，as it a伍rmativelysupports a local government's 
attempts to build adaptive capacity by shielding them from 
property owners that seek to limit the government regu-
lations along the coastline. Further， courts have “strongly 
and universally" supported floodplain regulations against 
takings claims，凶 claimsthat can have a signi五cantchilling 
c百ecton local government's adaptive planning efforts. 
Actions for failing to adequately regulate flood-prone 
areas have been les successful. 125 In general， governmental 
units have no duty to adopt regulations absent a legislative 
mandate requiring adoption.凶1hisis the case for much 
the same reason as actions related to nonstructural mea-
sures have failed， including no duty to confer a bene五tand 
sovereign immunity.127 1hough sovereign immunity leaves 
state or local governments immune from civil suit; when 
governments act as landowners they are su旬ectto liabil-
ity for impacts from their construction and operation of 
structural measures， such as dams， levees， and groins.128 
If， however， governments are designing or implementing 
nonstructural measures that involve a high degree of dis-
cretion， such as flood forecasting， sovereign immunity will 
apply under the discretionary function exception to the 
waiver of sovereign immunity.129 1hough sovereign immu-
nity might at五rstimpression appear to present signi五cant
hurdles，130 there remain many other SLR-related impacts 
that are actionable， asdemonstrated above. 
123. Kusler， sψra note 108， atう， 42-43. Kusler cites numerous cases that fi口und
governmental units liable or potentia11y liable for issuing permits or approv 
mgsl削 ivisions，including: 5heffet v. Co附 σザ、LosAngel，叫 84Cal. Rptr. 11 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (court held that county was liable when it approved the 
subdivision and accepted dedication of her facilities， which resulted in a flood 
and urgent damages); Cou吻 ofClarkv. Powers， 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1980) 
(court applied a“reasonable use" rule for surface waters and held city liable for 
increased funding to urbanization and ci日目 floodcontrol activi日目);Pickle v. 
Board ofCounσCommトofC，仰 nσofP，μ前， 764P.2d 262 (Wyo. 1988) (court 
held that county duty to exercise reasonable ca配 inreviewing subdivision plan 
is potentia11y liable in negligence or flooding problems with wastes disposal 
because of failure to use such care); Eschete v. City of Nω Orlea叫 24ラ50.2d
383 (La. 1971) (court held that city could be held liable for approving subdi 
vision that overtaxed drainage system and c制。dflooding). 
124.Id. 
12ラー Id.at 41. 
126.Id. 
127. 5ee id 
128. Id. at 13. 
129. 5ee id; se also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation， 647 F. 
5upp. 2d 644， 703 (E.D. La. 2009) (“耳目 discretionaryfunction exception 
bars claims based on the performance of a discretionaty function and has no 
requirement to exercise due care.")ー
130. 5ee Kusler， supra note 108， at14. 5ee also id. at 17; ]ulius Rothschild & Co 
v. 5tate， 6ララP.2d877 (Haw. 1982); but se In re Katrina， 647 F. 5upp. 2d at 
Perhaps most signi五cantto adaptation litigation are the 
impacts to coastal property owners a百ectedby permitting 
and approving subdivisions. Many jurisdictions hold gov-
ernments liable， though a comparable number of courts 
have held the opposite. Quite ironically， states with incred-
ible vulnerabilities， like Hawaii，13 do not hold counties 
liable for permitting or subdivision approval，五ndingthat 
local governments have no duty to adjoining homeowners 
to ensure protection from flood risks.132 Yet， the advances 
in technology and quality of data that become available for 
river and stormwater systems， and those overlaid with SLR 
data， suggest that courts may increasingly hold governmen-
tal units liable.133 Kusler argues that， with such data avail-
able， communities can no longer convincingly argue that 
they were unaware of flood and erosion problems caused 
by development.134 Further， for jurisdictions like Hawaii 
that五ndno duty to homeowners， to the extent that duty 
is determined by foreseeab山tyof a harm，135 better data 
coupled with greater stresses at the coastline due to climate 
change might force a reconceiving of duty obligations local 
authorities owe to coastal property owners.136 Public policy 
may soon favor more expansive liability.137 
Further， juries will soon regularly consider“unreasonable 
government conduct" under very changed circumstances 
because of climate change. J uries will assess the reasonable-
ness of government action vis-a-vis flood hazards based on 
whether government staff had knowledge of the potential 
flood problems， the foreseeability of floods resulting in 
damage to individuals， and the degree of risk involved.138 
SLR will deeply a百ectal of these considerations. 
2. Developer Liability 
Current liability risks strongly suggest that developers 
might face greater liability due to continued land devel-
704-17 
131. Hawaii is a 100% coastal state， with its entire population residing in coastal 
counties. 5ee general，ゆHawaiiCZM Program， h叩://hawaii.gov/ dbedt/ 
czm/ (last visited Oct. 24， 2012); se also Wilkins， supra note 12， at 483 
(describing Alabama， Mississippi， and Texas as the Gulf states that are least 
likely to find local governments responsible for public works projec臼 or
planning decisions that cause or exacerbate flooding) 
132.5，町 Cooteyv. 5un Investment， Inc.， 718 P.2d 1086 (Haw. 1986) (county 
not liable for having approved subdivision plans， including drainage plans 
verifying result; court held that there is no breach of duty of care) 
133. Kusler， supra note 108， at 45; Dave Owens， Mapping， MotUling， 山仰，dt.めhe
五んr悶"tlgn問却附t仰 qイf、伽E
1η34. Id. Landowners will also have better access to computer-generated computers 
flood-erosion models that can calculate the ef五とc臼 thatspecific structures，五l1s，
and drainage works have on flood height velocities and erosion. Id. In the Aus 
tralia context， McDonald makes a similar prediction. McDonald， supra note 
14， at248 (stating that recent development approvals are likely to demand 
a higher level of care because public awareness and understanding climate 
change risks has increased so dramatica11y in r匹目立y回 rs)
13ラ5町 Wilkins，supra note 12. 
136. Id at 488 (“1here is reason to think that if sea level inundation continues i臼
observed trend， not to mention accelerated rate predicted by many models， 
effects will also submerge the discretionary function immunity defense for 
those governments who chose to ignore the coming threat.")ー
137. 5ee Kusler， supra note 108， at 1ラ1hisis not a slam dunk， however， asad-
ministrative concerns (due to the sheer number of possible claims) as we11 
as concerns over crushing liability may encourage legislators to steer these 
actions away from the courts 
138. Kusler， supra note 108， at13-14 
12-2012 れJEVゾS&ANAじ'(SIS 42 ELR 11155 
opment on increasing1y threatened coastlines. 1he histori-
ca1 trend regarding developer 1iabi1ity reflects an increased 
willingness to五nddevelopers 1iab1e for damages 1andown-
ers incur.139 Reflected in the doctrina1 progression from 
caveat emptor to more expansive 1iabi1ity in tort 1aw， socia1 
mores have counseled in favor of protecting 1andown-
ers in their transactions with developers.140 In particu1ar， 
case 1aw from Oregon and Indiana detai1 the more 1ibera1 
interpretations of developer 1iabi1ity due to poor siting and/ 
or construction， and， I suggest， portend the direction of 
tort 1itigation against developers as a resu1t of increasing 
climate-related risks. 
1he Salishan cases14 in Oregon， invo1ving oceanfront 
10ts p1agued by coasta1 erosion， clari五edboth contract 
and tort 1iabi1ity against developers， providing a helpfu1 
ana10gue to the adaptation tort. Relevant to the present 
discussion， these cases made clear that developers p1an-
ning to develop coasta1 1ands， particu1arly in characteris-
tically unstab1e coasta1 regions， must anticipate potentia1 
neg1igence 1iabi1ity.142 Whi1e contractua11iab山tymight be 
avoided， the court in Beri v. Salishan山 foundthat a devel-
oper has a duty of reasonab1e care to determine whether 
the 10ts sold are fIt for their intended use. Tort 1iab山ty，
with its additiona1 threat of punitive damages， may app1y 
to transactions invo1ving 1and a1one. 1his is true despite the 
fact that coasta1 erosion is a matter of common know1edge. 
1he Beri court， adopting a broader view of duty， found 
that developers are 1iab1e for fai1ure to exercise reasonab1e 
care in the development projects that they undertake.14 
Developers can， therefore， face tort 1iabi1ity as relative 
experts who have fai1ed to satisfy the“knew or shou1d have 
known" standard of care with respect to the dangers of 
1ands they develop and sell. 
Relevant to their expertise， whi1e a developer need not be 
aware of every 1atent defect， they can be“held responsib1e 
for 10sses to purchasers caused by his fai1ure to take reason-
ab1e precautions to determine whether the 10ts he offers are 
fIt for that purpose."凶1hemore 1ibera1 fInding of 1iabi1ity 
is echoed in the Indiana case， JordanιTalaga・1461hehom-
eowners in Talaga brought suit against subdivision develop-
ers from whom they purchased 10ts subsequently p1agued 
by severe water and drainage prob1ems. In五ndingagainst 
the developers， the co 
139. See genera砂]e百reyPiampiano， Coastal Erosion and the Rμ 0/μabi占σメ>r
Coastal Land Developers， 4]. 5MALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 347 (2000)ー
140.Id. at 3う3.
141. See Cook v. 5alishan Properties， Inc.，ラ69P.2d 1033 (Or. 1977) and Beri， 
Inc. v. 5alishan Properti口， Inc.，ラ80P.2d 173 (Or. 1978)ー
142. See Piampiano， supra note 139， at3ラ 61.1here may also be tort liability 
for failure to warn buyers of erosion risks. Id. at 36ラー67.See also McDonald， 
supra note 14， at2ラ6(extrapolating from cited cases， it could be argued that 
compliance with the statutory development approval will not obviate the 
need for developer to warn potential purchasers of known risks associated 
with impacts of climate change) 
143. Piampiano， supra note 139， at3ラ9.
144. Beri，ラ80P.2d at 176. 
14ラー Id.at 177. 
146.う32N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) 
burden of 1iabi1ity for “purely equitab1e reasons."山 Indeed，
other jurisdictions， such as Texas， have a1so found that the 
professiona1 developer， rather than the purchasing property 
owner， shou1d bear the risk of 10s. 148 In addition， asthe Taι 
aga court reasoned， developers “are in the best position to 
absorb the 10s attribut油1eto the 1atent， undisclosed e百ect
in the rea1 estate they sold."凶 Noton1y do they ho1d greater 
expertise and know1edge， they a1so have greater access to 
insurance to alleviate potentia1 erosion risks.1ラ0
Like 10ca1 governments， the reasonab1eness of develop-
ers' actions will turn on the foreseeabi1ity of the harms 
present， aswell as what they knew or shou1d have known. 
Foreseeabi1ity is particu1arly relevant in the context of 
coasta1 development; yet， because of the inherent unpre-
dictab山tyof the coasta1 environment-even ignoring SLR 
for the moment-foreseeabi1ity issues are among the most 
challenging. Foreseeabi1ity is based on historica1 patterns， 
but it is a1so based on what science and techno1ogy can 
project regarding future conditions.15 Ignorance， therefore， 
will not relieve the developer of 1iabi1ity. Even a developer's 
good-faith belief that a development is stab1e will not， asa 
matter oflaw， serve as a viab1e defense. 1he breach of devel-
oper's duty to purchasers may be estab1ished by presenting 
evidence that the developer knew or shou1d have known 
materia1 facts regarding the suitabi1ity of a development.152 
1his， incidentally， may a1so mi1itate in favor of exp10ring 
increased 1iabi1ity for rea1 estate brokers， aswell as others 
a10ng the chain of development and sa1e of proper早153At 
the very 1east， for developers to meet the appropriate due 
di1igence standard，“[tJort 1aw clearly impos口 aduty ‘to 
anticipate the usua1 weather of the vicinity， including al 
ordinary forces of nature.'"行
Coasta1 regions are characteristically dissimi1ar， though 
climate change poses a quite unique evidentiary di1emma 
for developers， and perhaps brokers. As discussed in Part 
II.A.， better science yields greater understanding of just how 
much more risky the coastlines might become. Indeed， it is 
clear that engineers are beginning to think about and p1an 
around these risks in earnest.15 SLR and related impacts 
147. Piampiano， supra note 139， at363. 
148. See Luker v. Arnold， 843 5.W2d 108 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)ー
149. Talaga，ラ32N.E.2d at 118ラ86
1ラO.Piampiano， supra note 139， at 364; see also Conklin v. Hurley， 428 50. 2d 
6ラ4，6ラ9(Fla. 1983)ー
1う1.Piampiano， sψra note 139， at 369. Explaining that even if natural forces 
had not struck a particular location before， liability may stil exist if rea 
sonable design， construction， operation， inspection， or maintenance should 
have anticipated and thereby prevented or minimized the risk. Id. 
lう2.See， e.g.， Easton v. 5trassburger， 199 Cal. Rptr. 383， 386-88 (Cal. Ct. App 
1984) (holding that a real出国tebroker was liableゐrnegligent misrep町 senta
tion in failing to disclose a material fact related to the soil conditions of a prop 
erty， which would have been discovered had the broker exercised due care). 
1う3.See Piampiano， supra note 139， at369 (arguing that public policy militates 
that a duty to inspect and inform fals upon the broker and citing Elizabeth 
A. Dalberth，同fairand Deceptive Ac釘 andPractices in Real Estate Trans 
制問s:The Duty to Disc/ose OffSi町 EnvironmentalHazards， 97 DICK. L 
REv.1う3，177 n.l71 (1992)， todemonstrate that imposing heightened duty 
would not be unduly burdensome) 
1ラ4.Piampiano， supra note 139 at 370 (citing Denis Binder， The Duty白 Disc/ose
Geolo!ic Hazards in Real Estate Tr.抑制ctions，1 CHAPMAN L. REV. 13， 49 
(1998))ー
1ララ.Watts， supra note 31. 
might make the foreseeability issue clearer， though likely not 
to the bene五tof developers and their desire to build at the 
coastline without the threat of liability. While knowledge of 
speci五cimpacts might elude developers， understanding the 
well-established projections about the decline of domestic 
coastlines is well within the grasp of developers. Further， rel-
evant to tort claims， asthe gravity of potential harm relative 
to the burden of preventing it increases，五ndingof unrea-
sonable behavior is also heightened. 
Reasonable behavior for a developer in light of the spec-
ter of SLR might entail the following: Developers will need 
to take al necessary measures to know their site and con-
tract for independent geological， hydrological， and engi-
neering studies that are based on the best available climate 
science for the region or topography before commencing 
development肘 -previouslywarranted measures at the 
coasts that are arguably even more important today and 
into the future. 1his kind of vigilance will allow develop-
ers to identify risky areas in light of emerging climate sci-
ence， incorporate the recommendations of engineers and 
geologists， and， whenever nec口sary，limit or cease develop-
ment in areas where the risk of catastrophic damage is sig-
III五cant.157Actions short of this may appropriately expose 
developers to increasing liability. 
川. Corrective (Climate) Justice 
1here are numerous possible claims that may be suc-
cessful against local governments and developers， con-
tradicting the enduring skepticism about the e伍cacyof 
tort law. 1hese possibilities， coupled with more sophisti-
cated science， suggest that courts are sensible spaces for 
remedy-seeking for climate change adaptation. It would 
be a means of arresting， at least partially， the acceler-
ating impacts of climate change utilizing a “thousand 
cuts" approach. 
In prior scholarship， 1 have both questioned158 and 
endorsed 159 climate-related tort litigation. As anthropo-
genic emissions and current and forecasted climate impacts 
1ラ6.Piampiano， supra note 139， at364. 
1ラ7.1his recommendation seems especially poignant when one considers the 
incredible proliferation of development in high-risk fire zones. For further 
discussion of increased property damage and casualties due to risky develop-
ment coupled with greater wild五rerisk due to climate change， see Michael 
Kodas & Burt Hubbard， PoliciιPutMoη"Coloradam at Risk， I-NEWS NET 
WO阻， http://www.inewsnetwork.org/redzone/ (last visited Oct. 8， 2012) 
Developer liability may curb this kind of development， in which short-term 
gains encourage profitable human settlements in ill-suited areas 
1ラ8.See Burkett，坤ranote 68; but se Hari Osofsky， R.φctzon5間 五utureDi 
庁 ctzo削メ>r Clima町 ]ustice，Commen四 yon Maxine Burkett， Clima町
Reparatio削， 10 MELBOURNE ]. INT'L L.う09(2009)， http://opiniojuris 
org120 10/02/111 a-response-to-maxine-burkett -by-hari-m-osofsky/ (last 
visited Oct. 26， 2012) (Osofsky convincingly argues that climate litigation 
is a valuable complement to the配 parationsscheme 1 proposed)ー
1う9.See Burkett， supra note 2. 
continue to frighteningly outpace any consequent action 
to curb climate change， it seems that al avenues should be 
used to their maximum potential. 1his is especially true if 
these avenues are not only well-suited for the procedural 
task， but also demand commitment to advancing justice as 
part of their core purpose. 
Further， itis incumbent upon those with particular 
concerns for individuals and communities that will suf-
fer more acutely to continue to identify every mechanism 
that is legally viable and that can have signi五cantimpact 
beyond the courtroom. 1hose seeking to advance climate 
justice160 should look to the trailblazers in theory and activ-
ism that have defIned the environmental justice movement. 
Although-or perhaps because-there was no law or legal 
mechanism that explicitly advanced environmental justice， 
advocates needed to五ndmyriad existing avenues to meet 
the ultimate goal of relieving some of the largely toxic， 
environmental burdens poor communities and communi-
ties of color shoulder.161 As Robert Verchick explains: 
[E]nvironmental statutes could be used to further the 
interests of social justice， [but] the terrain was not land-
scaped for that purpose. It took activists with imagination 
and grit to climb the peaks . . . It took lawyers who could 
scan the glaciers of federal code and find a foothold-a 
place where you could jam your steel-toothed boot， sta-
bilize your momentum， and launch yourself forward.162 
IV. Conclusion 
In this Article， 1 have attempted to persuade legal schol-
ars， practitioners， and potential claimants-even local 
governments and developers-that tort litigation relat-
ing to climate change adaptation deserves much greater 
attention. Climate change liab山tyhas enjoyed more spir-
ited and dynamic conversation in the academic arena， 
rather than familiar， yet potentially proli五cand produc-
tive， action in the court clerk's 0伍ce.1 argue that the 
more commonplace foundation on which climate change 
adaptation litigation would proceed presents a possible 
foothold desperately needed to meet justice goals. 1his 
could be an early step needed to launch a more transfor-
matlve Journ停
160“1he field of 'climate justice' (C]) is concer配 dwith the intersection of race 
and/or indigeneity， poverty， and climate change. It also recognizes the direct 
kinship between social inequality and四 vironmentaldegradation." Burkett， 
Climate ]ustice仰 dElusive Climate Tort， sψra note 2， at116 
161. See general，ウU.S.EPA， PlanE] 2014， Sept. 2011， http://www.epa.gov/com 
pliance/ ej/ plan司/index.html(last visited Oct. 24， 2012) 
162. Robert Verchick， EPA Rele出回Inventory0/ Legal Authorities to Advance Envi-
町 nmentaljustice，CPR BLOG， Feb. 13，2012， http://www.progressivereform. 
org (last visited Oct. 17， 2012)ー
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